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ABSTRACT
Privacy of Encrypted Voice Over Internet Protocol. (August 2008)
Tuneesh Kumar Lella, B.E.; M.S., Birla Institute of Technology
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr.Riccardo Bettati
In this research, we present a investigative study on how timing-based traffic analysis
attacks can be used for recovery of the speech from a Voice Over Internet Protocol
(VOIP) conversation by taking advantage of the reduction or suppression of the gen-
eration of traffic whenever the sender detects a voice inactivity period. We use the
simple Bayesian classifier and the complex HMM (Hidden Markov Models) classifier
to evaluate the performance of our attack. Then we describe the usage of acoustic
features in our attack to improve the performance. We conclude by presenting a
number of problems that need in-depth study in order to be effective in carrying out
silence detection based attacks on VOIP systems.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
VOIP calls may be considered difficult to intercept, but there are already many tools
over the internet that can capture and replay the entire conversations. So VOIP
community has come to a general agreement that VOIP communications must be
encrypted and in result many scalable and light-weight encryption methodologies have
been proposed. [2] and [3] are some among them. To be successful in maintaining the
privacy and security of the VOIP conversations, utmost importance should be given
to the confidentiality measures such as encryption to make sure that they are robust
to both cryptographic and “out-of-the-box” attacks and their capabilities are clearly
understood.
In the proposed research we are measuring the ability of the attacker to intercept
the encrypted VOIP conversation using the silence suppression feature of VOIP. To
compete with traditional phones and to have a wide and scalable deployment, VOIP
applications should be able to compete well by conserving bandwidth using silence
suppression and other such methods.
It is therefore likely that encrypted VOIP systems will continue to use silence
suppression in some way to conserve bandwidth.In this research we will propose traffic
analysis methodologies based on Bayesian classification and Hidden Markov models
and we will perform a series of experiments to measure how much information can be
gathered from an encrypted conversation that uses silence suppression.
The motivation for using traffic analysis is from different sources. The usage
of traffic and timing analysis to break confidentiality of the communication sessions
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2has become inevitable these days, as almost all the network communications are
involving the use of data encryption and header portions. Wagner et al. [4] used
the inter-keystroke time intervals of keyboard in SSH connections to infer the typing
behavior of users, and are able to crack the SSH passwords entered by the user. They
collected the inter-keystroke timings on the keyboard by many users and constructed
a Hidden Markov Model using which they are able to crack the passwords. We are
applying similar kind of approach in this research. Using the talk spurt lengths of
the words, we are using different approaches like simple Bayesian classification and
Hidden Markov Models to map the talk spurt lengths back to the spoken words.
3CHAPTER II
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
When the communication between participants in a network application is encrypted
and the content of the communication is beyond the reach of crypto-analysis, attackers
may want to resort to traffic analysis in order to gain information. Traffic analysis
infers information from traffic patterns, which may range from existence or absence of
communication to fine-grained timing analysis of packets or messages. The usage of
traffic and timing analysis to break confidentiality of the communication sessions has
become inevitable these days, as almost all the network communications are involving
the use of data encryption and header portions. Traffic analysis is also shown to be
applicable against anonymous communication systems [5], [6].
Wagner et al. [4] analyzed the inter-packet time intervals in SSH connections to
infer the typing behavior of users, and are able to crack the SSH passwords entered
by the user. For this they collected keyboard timings and trained a Hidden Markov
Model on keyboard inputs from users using which they are able to crack the passwords.
Packet timing analysis has been used in different variations to break anonymous
communication systems. In [5] and [6], traffic analysis based attacks on anonymous
web servers are described and quantitatively analyzed.The functionality of anonymous
web server is such that it acts as a proxy for the web clients and uses encryption and
packet header mangling like in a NAT proxy to reduce the correlation between any
incoming requests from users and outgoing requests to servers. The fact that number
of HTTP objects and their sizes are often revealed is used for this particular attack.
Number of objects and object sizes are used as a signature for identifying considerable
fraction of the webpages accurately. These signatures can be exploited by the attacker
until the web anonymizer takes care of this issue.
4The so called MIXes [8] are commonly used in anonymity networks, for example
in TOR [7]. These MIXes re-route traffic, encrypt the content and the headers,
and perturb the timing and order of packets to make the traceability of connection
hard. Attacks exist on these MIXes as well. Serjantov and Sewell [9] analyzed the
possibility of a lone flow on an input link of a MIX. If the rate of this lone input flow
is approximately equal to the rate of a flow out of the MIX, this pair of input and
outflow flows are correlated.
Similarity between sender’s outbound traffic and receiver’s inbound traffic be-
came a source of analysis for some traffic analysis experts. For example Zhu et
al. used statistical measures like mutual information to correlate the flows and are
successful. Their observation from the TCP flows indicate that too much timing per-
turbation in the MIXes makes anonymity weak to maintain. Levine et al. [11] are
also interested in the problem of discovering if two participants are communicating,
and they use cross correlation to measure similarity between flows. They proposed a
defensive dropping method to thwart the attack. In continuous MIXes, each packet
is delayed independently and Danezis [12] uses this fact as a starting point for attack
and describes the departure distribution of packets as a convolution of the arrival with
delay distribution, which in turn provides the basis for the correlation of incoming
and outgoing packets.
Traffic analysis has been used to develop detectors for honeypots or other forms
of bots in multiplayer online games. To emulate user behavior (game-bots or crawlers)
or system-level latencies (in honeynets) , the bots typically follow a timing pattern.
This observation is shown in [17] with the implementation of the timer management
mechanism of the operating system which shows the pattern in form of periodicities
in inter-response times in honeynets.
Correlation attacks may not be able to scale up when large systems are used. Zhu
5and Bettati [13] considered appropriate preconditioning of timing data and they used
Blind-Source-Separation [14] to separate the traffic into groups of flows. Manipulation
of timing data is also considered by some. For example, Serjantov et al. [9] uses
“spikes” in the traffic to find the communication relationship between users. Fu et al.
[15] propose “flow marking” in a wireless setting, where periodic interference patterns
are generated, which in turn are visible along the path of the affected connection. A
similar mechanism has been proposed by Wang et al. [16] to trace VOIP calls. At
the sender a slight adjustment is done to the timing of the VOIP packets by delaying
packets of different VOIP calls according to different patterns. The authors claim
that the disturbance is sufficiently small so as to not be noticed by the end users.
At the same time, the timing mark can still be recovered near the receiver so as to
identify the originator.
6CHAPTER III
MOTIVATION
Traffic Analysis in VOIP is greatly helped by silence suppression. Silence suppression
in VOIP aims to save network bandwidth by not transmitting packets when either
parties of a VOIP conversation are silent. In order to be widely and scalably deployed,
VOIP requires both low bandwidth voice compression and silence suppression. In
constraint bandwidth environments, the need for bandwidth conservation is critical.
In less constraint environments, the need to be a “good citizen” requires the VOIP
to conserve bandwidth as well. For example, Skype relies on relays to route some of
its traffic. Since these relays are Skype user nodes, they have to co-habit well with
the rest of the applications and traffic at their site. Otherwise, they may attract the
attention of system administrators and be shut down. A brief description of silence
suppression in some of the widely used VOIPs follows. In the rest of the thesis, we
describe how we take advantage of silence suppression to violate VOIP confidentiality.
A. Silence Suppression in VOIP
Each VOIP software uses its own voice codec to code and packetize the voice signals.
To conserve the bandwidth used, voice activation detection scheme is used to reduce
(e.g. in Skype or GTalk) or suppress (e.g. in SpeakFreely) the sending of packets
during silence periods of the conversation. GTalk uses voice activity detection and
sends “comfort noise” packets during silence periods and at a slower rate compared
to that of during the speech periods.
Skype [18] sends UDP packets at a rate of one every 60 ms during the voice active
periods, i.e. when the sender is speaking. Each such packet contains two frames of
30 ms iLBC (Internet Low Bit-rate Codec) [1] compressed speech. During a silence
7period, the sender generates UDP packets of 25 bytes each every 100 ms.
Table I. Silence suppression in GTalk
Packet Delta(ms) Jitter(ms) Status
31 0 0 comfort noise (PT=13
33 96.43 40.46 Comfort noise (PT=13
35 104.48 43.84 Comfort noise (PT=13
38 97.99 47.48 Comfort noise (PT=13
41 96.58 50.97 Comfort noise (PT=13
68 61.21 253831.93 [ Ok ]
72 62.68 297963.02 [ Ok ]
75 59.88 339336.9 [ Ok ]
77 58.62 378124.93 [ Ok ]
83 61.02 414488.12 [ Ok ]
GoogleTalk [18] also uses voice activity detection and sends “comfort noise”
packets during silence periods and at a slower rate compared to that of during the
speech periods to save bandwidth. Google Talk uses packetization intervals that
are similar to Skype, that is, 60 ms during talk spurts and 100 ms during silence
periods. But Google Talk can use a number of codecs and in most of the cases,
it uses a variable bit-rate PCM codec that results in speech-dependent packet sizes
that are between 120 and 200 bytes. Table I shows the GTalk conversation packet
trace as captured by the Wireshark [19] network monitor. The trace indicates a talk
spurt followed by a silence period. Wireshark correctly labels the packets sent during
the silence period with a “comfort noise” tag in the plain text trace. Talk spurts
can also be distinguished from silence periods by monitoring the inter-packet times
(marked “Delta” in the table): At the beginning of the talk spurt, the inter-packet
8time drops to approximately 60 ms and when the silence period starts, it returns to
approximately 100 ms.
Table II. Silence suppression in SpeakFreely
Packet Delta(ms) Jitter(ms) Status
16 79.99 0.95 [ Ok ]
17 79.98 0.89 [ Ok ]
18 79.99 0.84 [ Ok ]
19 80.00 0.79 [ Ok ]
21 559.94 30.73 [ Ok ]
22 79.99 28.31 [ Ok ]
SpeakFreely [20] is a freeware VOIP that supports a variety of codecs, such as
GSM and adaptive differential PCM (ADPCM). GSM, for example, operates at 13
kbit/sec and uses a 80 ms packet period. SpeakFreely uses silence suppression instead
of silence detection i.e. it does not send any packets during silence periods, making
the silence detection by timing-based traffic analysis very simple. Table II shows the
trace of a SpeakFreely voice conversation as captured by wireshark. The data shows
a talk spurt (packets 1 to 4) followed by a silence period of 560 ms (packet 5), which
in turn is followed by another talk spurt (starting at packet 5).
B. Problem Statement
Although silence suppression can significantly save bandwidth, it can disclose the end
users’ conversation behavior. In fact, when only the encrypted packet flow is available,
talk spurts and other characteristics can be estimated from the packet timings. Due
to the encryption of the VOIP flow, we assume that content or size of VOIP packets
9is of no relevance. From the packet timestamps, the attacker reconstructs the inter-
packet delays and packet rates. In this data, she applies the thresholding to detect
voice activity and so is able to construct a series of estimates of the talk spurt lengths
in the VOIP conversation. The attacker tries to map these talk spurt lengths of words
back to the original words spoken.
The objective of this research is to study the effectiveness of the speech recovery
by the attacker. This study comprises the description of attack methodology, which
involves talk spurt estimation based on packet timings and the speech recovery, and
then the evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack followed by the usage of acoustic
measures for performance improvement.
Throughout this thesis, we assume that the attacker uses an automated system
for data collection and for classification. We assume that a human operator processes
the results provided by the classification algorithms (for example by listening to the
recovered conversations) and intelligently filters and edits the classification results.
In this way, we expect that less than perfect classifiers can still be effective as long as
they allow the psycho-receptive mechanism of the human operator to complete the
recovery of the conversation.
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CHAPTER IV
SYSTEM MODEL AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. System Model
We consider a VOIP communication between a single sender and a receiver. The
communication is modeled as a sequence of symbols s0, s1, . . . , si, . . . (each symbol is
a spoken word in our case) that are sent over the VOIP connection. The sequence of
symbols is presented as input to the VOIP system in form of a continuous voice signal.
Let li be the length of the voice signal of symbol si (the accurate talk spurt length).
The accurate talk spurt lengths li of the symbols si are calculated by detecting the
start and the end of the voice spurt in the voice signal using the audio editor software,
audacity [21]. In the VOIP conversation, the packets are encrypted and likely padded
to a fixed size. Hence, in this thesis, we assume that packet sizes are of no use to the
observer.
The attacker is assumed to have access to the VOIP conversation link. She “lis-
tens” to the VOIP conversation by establishing a wiretap and collecting the times-
tamps of the packets. Inter-packet delays are calculated by the attacker from the
packet timestamps, and a simple thresholding is applied on this data to detect voice
activity, and the attacker will be able to construct a series of estimates l′0, l
′
1, . . . , l
′
i
of the original spurt lengths l0, l1, . . . , li of the symbols. Now that the attacker has
collected the estimated spurt lengths, her objective is to reconstruct the original se-
quence of symbols.
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B. Methodology
A set of voice signals, each representing a symbol, is selected from a plain text data by
the attacker for training. An important assumption is that the sentences are spoken
slowly during training, i.e. there is a minimal silence period between each word in
a sentence. For each talk spurt in the sequence, she computes, over all the symbols,
the probability distribution P (si|l′j) of a talk spurt being classified as a particular
symbol. For each symbol, the attacker is assumed to have access to a sufficient
number of occurrences of each symbol. As a result, each symbol si has a sufficiently
large number of samples s1i , . . . , s
k
i , . . . , s
n
i . The talk spurt length distribution of each
symbol thus approximates to a Gaussian distribution. Once the spurt lengths are
measured, and the gaussian distributions are estimated, the attacker performs two
types of training, which we call context unaware and context aware.
1. Context-Unaware Training
By “Context unaware” we mean that each symbol in the sequence of words is con-
sidered individually and the grammar of the sentence is not considered. The talk
spurt lengths l
(k)
i of sample s
(k)
i , both of the direct voice signal and of the voice sig-
nal that is sent over the VOIP conversation link, are determined, and the likelihood
probability distribution P (li = l|si) for each talk spurt length l over all the symbols
si is calculated. A classifier based on Bayesian analysis [22] is used by the attacker
to reconstruct the symbol distributions from the collected estimated spurt lengths.
In general, Bayes’ theorem [22] is used to compute the probability of an event,
given the observation. Given the observation B, the probability of event A is calcu-
lated as
12
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
(4.1)
Here P (B|A) is called the likelihood probability and P (A|B) is called the posterior
probability.
Using the Bayes’ theorem , we calculate the posterior probabilities for each sym-
bol si, given the talk spurt length li. We classify the observed talk spurt length l as
the symbol s∗ having the largest posterior value P (si|l), where
s∗ = argmaxSiP (si|l) =
P (l|si)P (si)
P (l)
(4.2)
The classification based on Equation (4.2) is context unaware because P (si|l)
depends on the likelihood distribution for si only.
2. Context-Aware Training
The encrypted transmission of symbols over a VOIP channel can be represented as
a discrete-time Markov-Modulated Process, where each state (representing the trans-
mission of a symbol) triggers the (observable) emission of a spurt of length l. The
a priori probability of sequences of symbols to appear in a text can be captured in
form of transition probabilities between states in the Markov model. Since only the
sequence of talk spurt lengths l1, l2, . . . is observable, while the sequence of transmit-
ted symbols remains hidden, we call such a Markov model a Hidden Markov Model
(HMM).
More formally for our problem, the HMM is formulated as follows:
• Let S be a set of states that emit output symbols in R.
• Let A = ak,i be a |S| × |S| matrix of state transition probabilities.
• Finally, let O = {Ok} be a set of continuous random variables, one for each
13
state in S.
Sending encrypted symbols over a VOIP channel then corresponds to the following
HMM:
• S = {S1, S2, . . . , SN}, corresponding to the set of symbols.
• A, corresponding to the a priori sequences of words in the underlying language
of communication over the VOIP channel.
• O = {O1, O2, . . . , ON}, where Oi corresponds to the length distribution of talk
spurts for symbol Si.
A path pi = pi1 · · · pin in the HMM is a sequence of states and represents a sentence
transmitted over the VOIP channel. The attacker observes the sequence o = o1 · · · on.
Given that the sequence pi is hidden from the attacker, the latter faces a Decoding
Problem, that is, she has to find an optimal path pi∗ = argmaxpiP (o|pi) for o such
that P (o|pi) is maximized.
In this training step the transition matrixA is constructed based on the sequences
of symbols (words) in the training sentences, and the random variables in O are
borrowed from the previous, context-unaware training step.
During the attack, the observer uses dynamic programming, for example the
Viterbi algorithm [24], to estimate an optimal path based on the observed spurt
lengths. In this way she reconstructs the sequence of words transmitted over the
VOIP channel.
In summary, the attacker does not rely on packet content, or packet sizes in
her attempt to reconstruct the sequence of words transmitted. Instead, she relies on
packet timing information only, in order to identify talk spurt boundaries.
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the effectiveness of the attack described in the previous chapter, we con-
ducted a sequence of experiments both for the (admittedly unrealistic) case where
accurate talk spurt lengths (measured length of voice signals in units of time) are
available and for the case where the talk spurt lengths have been estimated from
analysis of packet timings. The ability to map the talk spurt lengths back to the
original symbols (words) is considered as the measure of performance. The perfor-
mance measures are calculated for both the cases- Context-unaware case that uses a
Bayesian classifier to estimate the symbols and Context-aware case that uses a HMM
based classifier on training sentences.
We used the following rhymes for our experiments. For simplicity, all the words
are treated separately i.e. there is a silence period after each word in the sentence.
Rhyme 1: “Betty bought some batter butter. But she found the butter
bitter. So she bought some better butter to make the bitter batter better.”
Rhyme 2: “Popeye the sailor man, lived in a garbage can, Ate all the
worms and spat out the germs; the best a man can.”
Rhyme 3: “My older brother is a pest, He loves to sit in the west, He
gets no rest, but pins his chest, to the lap top vest.”
New sentences are formed from the words in these rhymes and the corresponding
sequence of talk spurt lengths are fed to the classifiers, which will emit the output
sequence of symbols. Rhyme 1 allows us to separately evaluate the effectiveness of
context free symbol classification (e.g. the ability to separate “but” from “butter”
purely based on the spurt length) and the improvement we get after adding context
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awareness (e.g. the ability to separate similar sounding words like “better”or “bitter”
from “butter” or “batter”, which cannot be separated based on talk spurt length
only). Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3 combined as a single database of sentences are used
to verify the correctness of results obtained with the Rhyme 1 i.e. whether we get
similar results with a different set of sentences.
Each rhyme is repeatedly spoken, 25 times to calculate the gaussian distributions
of the talk spurt lengths for each symbol (word) in the database. The transition
probabilities required for the context-aware classifier are calculated from a set of
newly formed sentences (a total of 16 such sentences) from the words of Rhyme 1
above. Examples of such formed sentences are “Betty bought the bitter butter”,
“She bought the bitter butter”, “Make the bitter butter better” etc. Similarly, 25
new sentences are generated from the words of Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3.
A. Talk Spurt Analysis with Accurate Talk Spurt Lengths
As a base line we assume that the attacker has access to the accurate lengths of talk
spurts. For this, during the context-unaware portion of the training we use accurate
spurt lengths that have been determined by detecting the start and the end of the
voice spurt in the (non-packetized) voice signal.
Figure 1 shows the spurt length distribution of 50 samples each of the words
“bought”, “some”, and “batter”. From this figure we can clearly see that some
symbols (for example “bought” and “batter”) can be clearly separated based on the
spurt length, while others (for example “bought” and “some”) have similar spurt
lengths and their talk spurt length distributions overlap.
We calculated confusion matrices using talk spurt length distributions from 25
samples for each symbol for random guess classifier, Bayesian classifier and HMM
16
Fig. 1. Accurate spurt lengths of voice signals
based classifier. In the confusion matrix, an entry, for example ci,j signifies the prob-
ability that Symbol Si is classified as Symbol Sj. If the classifier is perfect, then
C would be an identity matrix. For this, we randomly feed one of the 16 training
sentences to the classifier and calculate the corresponding confusion matrix based on
the input and the output sequences. For the HMM classifier, we use the remaining
15 sentences for training. All the 16 sentences are either 4 words or 5 words long and
there are totally 14 words in the Rhyme 1. For example, to get an classification error
of 0.2, the random guessing should guess 4 words wrongly in a sentence of 5 words
long. The corresponding probability is C5,4 ∗ (13/14)4 ∗ (1/14). The performance of
random classifier suffers badly as the total number of words increase. We obtained a
corresponding confusion coefficient by adding all the elements ci,j except the diago-
nal ones (ci,i), for each of the confusion matrices from the 3 classifiers. The less the
confusion coefficient, the better the performance of the classifier. Figure 2 shows the
comparison of the confusion coefficients for the random, Bayesian and HMM based
classifiers. Confusion coefficient is less for the HMM classifier which makes the HMM
17
classifier better than the Bayesian and random classifiers.
confusion coefficients of accurate  talk spurts
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Fig. 2. Comparing confusion coefficients of random, Bayesian and HMM(15) classifiers
on sentences using accurate spurt lengths of Rhyme 1
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Fig. 3. Histogram of classification errors using random, Bayesian and HMM(15) clas-
sifiers on sentences using accurate spurt lengths of Rhyme 1
Figure 3 compares the effectiveness of the Bayesian Classifier against the HMM
classifier with 15 training sentences in correctly recognizing a spoken sentence. For
this, we randomly feed one of the 16 training sentences to the classifier and record the
percentage of erroneously classified words. Performance of random guessing, which
is obviously poor, is also included for comparison. The histograms clearly illustrate
the benefits of context-aware training using HMM. HMM classifier worked far better
than the Bayesian classifier and there are also instances in which all the words are
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detected correctly in a sentence (zero error rate case).
Accurate talk spurt length distributions for words from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3,
and classifiers’ performance comparison results obtained with the sentences formed
from the combination of these words, can be found in appendix A. We got similar re-
sults for this case as well. The Matlab code used for HMM and Bayesian classification
can be found in Appendix B.
B. Talk Spurt Analysis on Packetized Voice Signal
When only the encrypted packet flow is available, the talk spurt lengths must be
estimated from the packet timing. In these experiments we focused on GTalk. First
we establish a VOIP connection between two GTalk users. Then the sender starts
speaking the preselected sentences with gaps between words over the VOIP connec-
tion. She repeats the sentences several times to have a Gaussian distribution for the
estimated talk spurt lengths of each symbol, which is essential for the classification of
talk spurt lengths as symbols. For simplicity, we use Wireshark [19] at the receiver to
capture packets from the sender, and we use the timestamp information to identify
talk spurts. Figure 4 illustrates the procedure in which we estimate the talk spurt
lengths.
A description of trace of GTalk conversation is given in Chapter III, with Table
I as reference. Delta column shows the relative timings when the packets are sent.
We use the values in the interval 95-105ms for the delta column as a threshold to
mark the start time of silence and finish time of talk spurt. Similarly, we use the
values in the interval 55-65ms as a threshold to mark the start time of the talk spurt
and finish time of silence. Then we calculate the talk spurt lengths by finding the
difference between the corresponding sum of timings (in the delta column) until the
19
Sender Receiver
Spoken Sentences
Collect 
Packet timestamps
Thresholding 
On
Time stamps
Talk spurt Lengths
Fig. 4. Talk spurt length estimation procedure
talk spurt finish time and the sum of timings until the talk spurt start time.
We repeat the same series of experiments as for the case of accurate spurt length
measurement i.e. measuring the effectiveness of classifiers in detecting the sentence
correctly.
Fig. 5. Estimated spurt lengths based on packet timing in GTalk
Figure 5 illustrates how packet-timing based voice activity detection is a very
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noisy estimator for spurt lengths, to a level where simple Bayesian classifier becomes
difficult to apply. We see how symbols with some overlap in their talk spurt dis-
tributions at voice signal level (for example “bought” and “some”) become nearly
impossible to distinguish at packet-timing level. Symbols that have no overlap at
voice-signal level (for example “bought” and “batter”) now become more difficult to
distinguish at packet-timing level.
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Fig. 6. Histogram of classification errors using random, Bayesian and HMM(15) clas-
sifiers on sentences using estimated spurt lengths of Rhyme 1
Figure 6 illustrates the poor performance of the classification with estimated
spurt length data. In this experiment, the HMM based classifier performs somewhat
better than the ones based on Bayesian classifier and random guessing.
Estimated talk spurt length distributions for words from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3,
and classifiers’ performance comparison results obtained with the sentences formed
from the combination of these words can be found in Appendix A.
Two factors that are inherent to the silence detectors applied in the VOIP system
contribute to the poor performance of spurt length estimation: First, a silence thresh-
old level is used in the silence detector to determine voice activity. If the strength of
a speech signal is below the threshold, the speaker is regarded as being silent. Obvi-
ously if the threshold is too low or too high, the accuracy of the talk spurt estimator
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suffers. This effect is illustrated by the outliers in the histograms in Figure 5, which
were caused by extraneous noise, i.e. the acoustic noise around the microphone, in
the experiment. Second, the hang-over time of the silence detector in the sender
negatively affects the accuracy of our estimator. Hang-over time is the duration by
which a silence detector delays its final decision to terminate the talk spurt, and its
main purpose is to avoid end clipping of speech. Similar to the silence threshold,
hang-over time affects both accuracy of our estimator and bandwidth saving. These
effects are particularly strong in these experiments because of the short spurt lengths
(i.e. multiples of few packet intervals). We expect that these effects are not as strong
in longer bursts. In such cases, however, the set of symbols will be very large, thus
rendering the classification more difficult.
C. Improvement with n-Viterbi
The talk spurt length distributions for many word pairs are naturally overlapping, and
this is particularly the case when the lengths are estimated from the packet timings,
which can be clearly seen in Figure 5. This affects the performance of the Bayesian
classifier and HMM based classifier as well.
Fortunately in our case, a human operator operates the classification results
and filters out erroneous classifications. Classification errors are frequently easily de-
tectable by the human operator, since the resulting sentence makes little or no sense.
Therefore it is sufficient for a classifier to generate a small set of “candidate” classifi-
cations, from which the presumably intelligent operator picks the most appropriate.
In these experiments we make use of the n-Viterbi algorithm, an extension to the
1-Viterbi that simultaneously generates a selection of solutions rather than a single
one. For a given value for n, n-Viterbi returns n solutions, from which the human
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operator picks the most appropriate one. The value of n is 4 in our case. From the
4 output sequences, the sequence with the maximum number of correctly classified
words is selected for measuring the performance.
performance comparison of 1-Viterbi & 4-Viterbi (histogram 
for estimated talk spurts)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.667 0.75 0.8 0.833 1
1-viterbi
4-viterbi
random
performance comparison of 1-Viterbi & 4-Viterbi (histogram 
for estimated talk spurts)
0
50
100
150
200
0 0.2 0.25 0.33 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.8 0.83 1
1-Viterbi
4-Viterbi
random
Fig. 7. Comparing performance of 1-Viterbi and 4-Viterbi on sentences using estimated
spurt lengths from Rhyme 1 and combination of Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3
Figure 7 shows the improvement in the performance with n-Viterbi compared
to that of 1-Viterbi. The histogram on the left shows the performance from the
sentences using Rhyme 1 and the histogram on the right shows that of the sentences
from the combination of Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3. There are no instances in which
all the words are classified incorrectly with 4-Viterbi in the case of Rhyme 1 and the
number drastically reduced in the second case, which is a major improvement over
1-Viterbi. The significant improvement in the second case can be attributed to the
condition that words are less similar to each other compared to that of first case and
hence resulting in talk spurt length distributions less overlapping.
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CHAPTER VI
IMPROVEMENT OF RESULTS USING ACOUSTIC FEATURES
A. Acoustic Features
The experiments in Chapter V measure the performance of the classifiers in terms
of their effectiveness to correctly classify symbols. The error rates in Figure 6 and
Figure 7, for example, are calculated as follows:
• Compare the test sentence and the output from the classifier word by word
• For each word, if the classifier detects the word correctly, then the error is zero,
otherwise, the error is one.
While this measure is appropriate for speech recognition applications where the
symbols must be correctly identified by an automated system, it is much less so for
our setting, where a human operator observes and filters the results generated by the
classifier. In our case, the operator naturally ignores minor errors in the classification,
for example errors between acoustically similar words such as “butter” for “batter”.
As a result, the problem at hand is less a speech recognition problem rather than an
audio query problem: The classifier returns a list of likely sentences that correspond
to the input spurt lengths. If the result is returned in acoustic form, the operator will
be able to identify the original sentence easily if it is offered, and can ignore minor
errors in the classification.
Simply counting classification errors in such a setting does not provide a mea-
sure for the “usefulness” of the classifiers to the operator. More appropriately, any
effectiveness measure must penalize errors according to their effect on the ability of
the operator to reconstruct the original sequence of symbols.
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In the following, we will be using acoustic similarity as a heuristic measure for the
ability of the operator to naturally correct classification errors. The rationale is that
the operator can more easily correct errors when the symbols sound similar (such
as “butter” instead of “better”), than when the symbols sound distinctly different
(such as “better” and “the”). Similarity measure is the indication of closeness of the
audio signals being compared. We considered the dominant feature vectors based
similarity measure [25] used for calculating similarity measure between words and
Bhattacharyya distance [26] used for calculating distances between classes. A brief
explanation of both the similarity measures is given in the following two subsections.
1. Dominant Feature Vector Based Similarity Measure
We first extract the features from the words and then the similarity measure is calcu-
lated between the words using the dominant features. Audio features that are consid-
ered are 13 Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) [27], short time energy [28]
and zero cross rate [28]. MFCCs represent the spectral envelope of an audio signal.
The zero-crossing rate is the rate at which the signal changes from positive to nega-
tive or vice-versa. Short-Time energy is a simple short-time speech measurement that
can in a way distinguish between voiced (voice active period) and unvoiced (silence
period) speech segments, since unvoiced speech has significantly smaller short-time
energy. Each audio clip is divided into N audio frames. An n-dimensional feature
vector is extracted from each frame and normalized to zero mean and unit variance.
Thus, the audio clip is represented as a n × N matrix [25]. Dominant features are
obtained by computing the Eigen decomposition on the covariance of frame based
feature vector.The reason for doing Eigen-decomposition is to find the vectors that
describe the characteristics of audio clip in the best possible manner. Eigen vectors
associated with large Eigen values represent most of the information, and hence they
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can be considered as dominant feature vectors.
plot of sorted Eigen values
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 5 10 15
sorted Eigen values
Fig. 8. Plot of sorted Eigen values
Figure 8 shows the plot of sorted Eigen values for a sample audio clip. From
the figure, we can be sure that the top 8 Eigen vectors contribute most to the audio
clip. The number of Eigen vectors over the entire set of words in our experiments are
selected by observing the Eigen values and the value is selected as 8. The equation
below is used to calculate the similarity measure between audio clips (words in our
case).
S =
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
wi,jsi,j, where (6.1)
wi,j =
pi√
n1∑
i=1
p2i
qi√
n2∑
i=1
q2i
, and (6.2)
si,j =
||XTi Yj||2
||Xi||2||Yj||2 . (6.3)
The values pi and qj are the Eigen values of the i
th and jth. Xi and Yj are the
corresponding Eigen vectors. The similarity measure is calculated by giving more
weight to the Eigen vectors with large Eigen values. The weighted sum is designed
such that if the two audio clips are the same, then the weighted sum should be equal
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to one. The similarity measure value will be between zero and one. The higher the
similarity between the audio clips, the closer the value will be to one. The Matlab
code for the computation of similarity measure can be found in Appendix B.
The phonetics involved in any word can be known easily using a dictionary. We
can use Acoustic-Phonetic Continuous Speech Corpus like TIMIT [29] to compare
phonemes of words and compute the distance between the words. This can serve as
an alternative to similarity measure.
2. Bhattacharyya Distance
The Bhattacharyya distance [26] is a theoretical distance measure between two Gaus-
sian distributions. It is computationally simple and can be used to derive an upper
bound on the optimal Bayesian classification error probability between two classes.
The Bhattacharyya distance Dbhat is defined as follows
Dbhat =
1
8
(M2 −M1)T [
∑
1 +
∑
2
2
]−1(M2 −M1) + 1
2
ln
|
∑
1 +
∑
2
2
|√|∑1 ||∑2 | . (6.4)
Mis and
∑
is are the means and covariance matrices of the two Gaussian distribu-
tions. Optimal Bayesian classification error between two classes with equal a priori
probability is bounded by the expression εbhat = 0.5 ∗ exp(−Dbhat).
The optimal Bayesian classification error can be used to gauge how inherently dif-
ficult the classification problem is. We will use these similarity measures to determine
the penalties associated with the classification errors.
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B. Experiments
1. Dominant Feature Vector Based Similarity Measure
We have done the similar experiments that we have done in the previous chapter.
The difference here is the error measurement method. similarity measure si,j is an
indication of closeness of the audio clips and the value of similarity measure always
varies between zero and one. Hence distancei,j = 1−si,j can be considered as penalty
of classification error between the audio clips.
Fig. 9. Dendrogram of distancei,j between symbols of Rhyme 1
Figure 9 shows the dendrogram for the distancei,j between words of Rhyme 1.
Clear observation is that similar words like “butter”, “better” and “batter” are very
near to each other. We considered random, Bayesian, HMM (1-Viterbi), HMM (4-
Viterbi) and optimal classifiers to show the improvement in performance. Optimal
means the classifier detects all the symbols in the sentence correctly and it is the
maximum performance we can obtain using similarity measure based performance
evaluation. We aforetime store the acoustic representations of all the utterances of
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all the symbols. For each symbol, we elect the centroid sample as the representative
signal from the collection of the sample signals. We measure the optimal performance
by calculating the average of the similarity measures between the representative voice
signals of the output sequence of symbols and the corresponding voice signals of the
test sequence. Random classifier classifies the symbols on a random basis out of the
words in the Rhyme 1 and the average distancei,j is calculated between the input and
the output sequence of symbols. In the similar way, we measure the performance for
the Bayesian, 1-Viterbi and 4-Viterbi cases.
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Fig. 10. Similarity measure improvements for symbols of Rhyme 1 with accurate and
estimated talk spurts
Figure 10 shows the improvement of the results with similarity measures for
performance evaluation for the estimated talk spurts of Rhyme1. Ideally, the optimal
performance value should be equal to zero. But it in reality, the similarity measure
will not equal zero between different pronunciations of the same word and hence there
is a lower threshold the performance can reach. But an intelligent human operator
can easily differentiate between different pronunciations of the same word easily and
this is not a major issue.
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2. Bhattacharyya Distance
From the distributions of symbols (words) that we have already used in the ex-
periments in the previous chapter, we calculated the pairwise Bhattacharyya dis-
tances between the symbol (words) distributions and calculated the respective optimal
Bayesian classification errors between classes.
Fig. 11. Dendrograms for Bhattacharyya distances and error rates for symbols of
Rhyme 1
Figure 11 shows the dendrograms of the Bhattacharyya distances between sym-
bols and the corresponding classification errors from the Rhyme 1. It can be clearly
seen that the similar words like “butter”, “better” and “batter” have small pairwise
distances and large Bayesian classification errors. Similar is the case with the symbols
from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3.
We selected three classifiers namely random, Bayesian and HMM classifiers to
show the improvement of the results with errors based on Bhattacharyya distance.
Random classifier classifies the symbols in the sequence (sentence) randomly, which
is the worst case behavior. We calculated confusion matrices for each of the cases
and obtained a corresponding confusion coefficient by adding all the elements ci,j
30
except the diagonal ones (ci,i). In random classification, ci,j = 1/n, where n is the
total number of symbols. Thus, the confusion coefficient in random case would be
n(1-(1/n)) = n-1.
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Fig. 12. Bhattacharyya improvements for symbols of Rhyme 1 with accurate and es-
timated talk spurts
Figure 12 shows the improvement with errors, calculated from Bhattacharyya
distance data from symbols of Rhyme 1. In the without Bhattacharyya case, we
add all the elements except the diagonal ones in the confusion matrix to get the
confusion coefficient and in the with Bhattacharyya case (using Bhattacharyya data),
each element, except the diagonal elements, ci,j is multiplied with the corresponding
probability of classifying symbol i as j, 1− εbhati,j and the products are added to get
the confusion coefficient.
Then we weighed the errors obtained with the absolute calculation in previous
Chapter V with the errors obtained from the Bhattacharyya distances between sym-
bols. Figure 13 shows the phenomena of weighing. There is a clear improvement in
the performance of all the classifiers, including random guess classifier, with Bhat-
tacharyya distance based evaluation. HMM based classifier clearly dominated other
classifiers.
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Fig. 13. Weighing the originally obtained errors with Bhattacharyya distance based
errors
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
On one hand, encryption of VOIP traffic is critical for the security and privacy of the
service participants. On the other, silence suppression is important for the deploya-
bility of VOIP services.
In this thesis, we investigated the effectiveness of the encryption in presence of si-
lence suppression. We presented a model in which attacker uses just the packet timing
information of the VOIP conversation to reconstruct the communication content. The
first observation is that with accurate talk spurt lengths, the performance of the model
is good in constructing the sentences spoken both by using context-unaware Bayesian
classifier and context-aware HMM based classifier, HMM obviously dominating the
Bayesian classifier. However, with the estimated talk spurt lengths, the performance
suffered badly with both Bayesian and HMM based classifiers. The major reason for
performance loss can be attributed to too much overlapping of estimated talk spurt
lengths of the symbols. In our case, a human operator filters out the erroneous clas-
sifications and hence we used n-Viterbi algorithm instead of 1-Viterbi algorithm in
HMM and we found a significant amount of improvement in the performance.
The problem we are dealing with is not a speech recognition problem and is
more similar to an audio query problem. If the result is returned in acoustic form,
the operator will be able to identify the original sentence easily if it is offered, and
can ignore minor errors in the classification. Hence, we resorted to acoustic measures
for our performance evaluation. We used dominant feature vector based similarity
measure between words and Bhattacharyya distance between word distributions as a
measure for performance evaluation instead of using the absolute method of one in
case of successful detection of word or zero in case of error. The reason is simple. We
33
are dealing with a similar problem like audio querying and getting similar results is
considered a success. For example, if the word “batter” getting detected as “better”,
the human operator is assumed to presumably intelligent to correctly identify the
word in the output sequence. There is a considerable improvement in the results with
the acoustic measures.
We are dealing with sentences with gaps between words, i.e. there is a small
silence gap between every word in the sentences spoken. The extension of this work
should be to check the effectiveness of the attack with sentences spoken without any
gaps between words. Also the use of other information like packet sizes, Jitter etc
and whether there will be any impact of these on the estimation of talk spurt lengths
need to be investigated.
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APPENDIX A
DATA AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FROM WORDS OF SECOND AND
THIRD RHYMES
The spurt length distribution data, and performance comparison of Bayesian and
HMM classifiers followed by the improved results using acoustic features of words for
accurate talk spurt sengths as well as estimated talk spurt lengths of words from
second and third rhymes are presented here.
Fig. 14. Accurate spurt lengths of voice signals of symbols from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme
3
In Figure 18, the number 22 signifies the bin which contains all the similar
sounding words like ‘pest’, ‘vest’, ‘chest’. It is obvious as the value of distancei,j is
less between similar words.
In Figure 20, the number 22 on the left part signifies the bin which contains
all the similar sounding words like ‘pest’, ‘vest’, ‘chest’. This result is obvious as the
value of Bhattacharyya distance is less between similar words.
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Fig. 15. Comparing Bayesian and HMM(24) classifiers on sentences using accurate
spurt lengths of symbols from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3
Fig. 16. Estimated spurt lengths of symbols from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3 based on
packet timing in GTalk
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Fig. 17. Comparing Bayesian and HMM(24) classifiers on sentences using estimated
spurt lengths of symbols from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3
Fig. 18. Dendrogram of distancei,j between symbols of Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3
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Fig. 19. Similarity measure improvements for symbols with accurate and estimated
talk spurts of symbols from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3
Fig. 20. Dendrograms for Bhattacharyya distances and error rates for symbols of
Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3
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Fig. 21. Bhattacharyya improvements for symbols with accurate and estimated talk
spurts of symbols from Rhyme 2 and Rhyme 3
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weighing with errors based on Bhattacharyya distance
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Fig. 22. Weighing the originally obtained errors with Bhattacharyya distance based
errors
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APPENDIX B
MATLAB CODE
The code structure used for HMM and Bayesian classification is provided here for
reference.
%%%%%%HMM and Bayesian classifier code in the same file%%%%
for num_tests=1:1
warning off;
test_talklengths=xlsread(’testing_talkspurts.xls’);
%%%%%loading pre-calculated gaussian distributions
%%%%%for the symbols of Rhyme 1
load Rhyme1_accurate_mean_std_talklengths.mat
%%%test sequences formed from symbols of Rhyme 1
testinstances=xlsread(’testcases.xls’);
%%%%%%corresponding talk spurt lengths of the
%%%%%test sequences above
%number of symbols
num_words=size(meanWords,2);
num_testinstances=num_tests;
num_testcases=size(testinstances,1);
for num_loops=1:200
%randomly picking instances for testing
randorder=randperm(num_testcases);
var=length(randorder);
training=testinstances(randorder
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(1:var-num_testinstances),:);
testsequence=testinstances(randorder
(var-num_testinstances+1:var),:);
testing=test_talklengths(randorder
(var-num_testinstances+1:var),:);
%%%transition probabilities from training sentences
paircounts(1:num_words,1:num_words)=0;
x=training;
j=1;
for i=1:size(training,1)
while(j<=size(training,2))
if(j==size(training,2))
break;
end
if((x(i,j)=0)&(x(i,j+1)=0))
paircounts(x(i,j),x(i,j+1))
=paircounts(x(i,j),x(i,j+1))+1;
end
j=j+1;
end
j=1;
end
prob_transition=[];
for i=1:num_words
for j=1:num_words
prob_transition(i,j)
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=paircounts(i,j)/sum(paircounts(i,:));
end
end
%calculating word counts
wordcounts(1:num_words,1)=0;
x=training;
for i=1:size(training,1)
for j=1:size(training,2)
if(x(i,j)=0)
wordcounts(x(i,j))=wordcounts(x(i,j))+1;
end
end
end
%prior probabilities of states(words)
for i=1:num_words
prob_states(i,1)=wordcounts(i,1)/sum(wordcounts);
end
%%%%%HMM and Bayesian classification
for k=1:num_testinstances
testData=testing(k,find(testing(k,:)=0));
testseq=testsequence(k,find(testsequence(k,:)=0));
sequence_length=length(testData);
for i=1:sequence_length
for j=1:num_words
B(i,j)=(1/(stdWords(1,j)*sqrt(2*pi)))*
exp(-((testData(i)-meanWords(1,j))^2)/
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(2*stdWords(1,j)*stdWords(1,j)));
end
end
if (num_tests==1)
posteriors=[];
result=[];
for len=1:sequence_length
for nw=1:num_words
posteriors(nw)=B(len,nw)*prob_states(nw);
end
[value index]=max(posteriors);
result=[result index]
end
bayesian_errors(num_loops)=
length(find(result=testseq))/length(path);
end
vit4_paths=
nviterbi_path(prob_states’,prob_transition,B’);
for z=1:size(vit4_paths,1)
temp_vit4_err(z)=
length(find(vit4_paths(z,:)=testseq))
/length(path);
end
vit4_err(num_loops,k)=min(temp_vit4_err);
clear B;
vit1_errors(num_loops,k)=temp_vit4_err(1);
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end
end
end
Dominant feature vectors based Similarity measure is calculated using the fol-
lowing code.
function sim=similarity_measure(signal1,signal2,fs)
%% number of eigens considered
num_eigens=8;
winlen=30/1000*fs %%%%%30ms long window
winoverlap=ceil(winlen/2);%%50% over lap
%% computing features
mfcc1=melfcc2(signal1,fs,’wintime’, 0.03, ’hoptime’,0.015);
ste1=short_time_energy(signal1,winlen,winoverlap);
zcr1=zero_cross_rate(signal1,winlen,winoverlap);
mfcc2=melfcc2(signal2,fs,’wintime’, 0.03, ’hoptime’,0.015);
ste2=short_time_energy(signal2,winlen,winoverlap);
zcr2=zero_cross_rate(signal2,winlen,winoverlap);
features1=[mfcc1;ste1;zcr1];
features2=[mfcc2;ste2;zcr2];
%%%%normalizing the features
features=[features1,features2];
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[norm_features,xmean,xstd]=myMapStd(features’);
temp1=myMapStd(features1’,xmean,xstd);
features1=temp1’;
temp2=myMapStd(features2’,xmean,xstd);
features2=temp2’;
%%%% eigen decomposition
covariance1=cov(features1’);
[eigen_vectors1,eigen_values1]=eigs(covariance1,num_eigens);
eigen_values1 = diag(eigen_values1);
covariance2=cov(features2’);
[eigen_vectors2,eigen_values2]=eigs(covariance2,num_eigens);
eigen_values2 = diag(eigen_values2);
%% weights
weights1=zeros(num_eigens,1); weights2=zeros(num_eigens,1);
for i=1:num_eigens
weights1(i,1)=eigen_values1(i,1)/sqrt(sum(eigen_values1.*eigen_values1));
weights2(i,1)=eigen_values2(i,1)/sqrt(sum(eigen_values2.*eigen_values2));
end
weights=weights1*weights2’;
%% similarity between individual features
s=zeros(num_eigens,num_eigens);
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for i=1:num_eigens
for j=1:num_eigens
temp=eigen_vectors1(:,i)’*eigen_vectors2(:,j);
s(i,j)=(temp)^2;
end
end
%%%similarity measure
sim=0; for i=1:num_eigens
for j=1:num_eigens
sim=sim+s(i,j)*weights(i,j);
end
end
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